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COMMENTARY
THE FUTURE OF DETAINEES IN THE GLOBAL WAR
ON TERROR: A U.S. POLICY PERSPECTIVE
Saxby Chambliss *
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 11, 2001, the terrorist network Al-Qaeda
launched a coordinated attack against the economic and political
capitals of the United States. Three domestic airplanes were hi-
jacked by A1-Qaeda members and systematically flown into the
World Trade Center towers in New York City and the Pentagon
in Washington, D.C. A fourth plane, due to the courageousness of
the passengers who took control of the cockpit from the terrorists,
crashed in a field in Pennsylvania, sparing the U.S. Capitol, or
possibly the White House, from similar destruction. The result of
these terrorist attacks was the largest single day death toll from
foreign attack on American soil, killing over 3,000 innocent civi-
lians.'
While Americans and the international community mourned
the losses caused by the terrorist attacks, the U.S. government
was on the defensive. Within days of the attack, on September 14,
2001, President Bush declared a national emergency.2 The same
day, Congress passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force
("AUMF"), granting the President authority to defend the nation
* United States Senator. Senator Chambliss is the Ranking Republican Member of
the Senate Agriculture Committee and a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intel-
ligence and the Senate Armed Services Committee.
1. See Bob Herbert, Vital Statistics, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2002, at A27; see also Rich-
ard Rhodes, What Terror Keeps Teaching Us, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2001, § 6 (Magazine),
at 91 (comparing the attack on Pearl Harbor to the attack on September 11, 2001).
2. Proclamation No. 7463, 3 C.F.R. 263 (2001), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1621 (2006).
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against attack and to combat Al-Qaeda. Shortly thereafter, on
October 7, 2001, the United States responded to these attacks by
initiating an armed conflict in Afghanistan, targeting A1-Qaeda
and the sanctuary it received from the Taliban.4
Since the early days following 9/11, Congress has crafted, and
the President has signed, a variety of legislation to address legal
issues which arose from the ongoing Global War on Terrorism
("GWOT").' In particular, in the Detainee Treatment Act ("DTA")6
and the Military Commissions Act ("MCA"),7 Congress created
the "most generous set of procedural protections" ever granted to
enemy combatants detained by the United States.' On June 12,
2008, the Supreme Court issued a 5-4 opinion in Boumediene V.
Bush, striking down portions of those generous procedural protec-
tions, and holding, for the first time in our nation's history, that
detainees in an ongoing conflict and held outside of the United
States at the U.S. Naval Base in Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba,
("GTMO") have the right to appeal their detentions under the
U.S. Constitution. 9
As a result of Boumediene, terrorists, detained by the United
States for aiding Al-Qaeda and committing atrocities against our
soldiers on the battlefield, may now enjoy many of the same con-
stitutional privileges as our own citizens. In some cases, they may
now receive even more protections than our own citizens enjoy in
a criminal context.1 ° In reaching this stunning conclusion, the
3. See 147 CONG. REC. S17045 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 2001); 147 CONG. REC. H17110,
17,156 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 2001).
4. See Afghanistan Wakes After Night of Intense Bombings, CNN, Oct. 7, 2001, http:/!
archives.cnn.com/200lIUS/10/07/gen.america.under.attack/.
5. See, e.g., Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.); Uniting
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Ob-
struct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.); Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978 Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (to be codified at scat-
tered sections of 50 U.S.C.); Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552
(to be codified at scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.).
6. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, 119 Stat. 2739
(codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 801 note, 28 U.S.C. § 2441, and 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd
and note (2006)).
7. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
8. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2279 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
9. Id. at 2262 (majority opinion).
10. Unlike U.S. citizens, terrorists can file a writ of habeas corpus without exhausting
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Court ignored numerous clear actions by Congress and the Presi-
dent and instead decided to move our detainee and national secu-
rity policies into the -federal courts. The Court also ignored the
fact that, despite having every opportunity to challenge their de-
tention through Combatant Status Review Tribunals ("CSRTs"),
many of the detainees at GTMO-including Boumediene-
actively refused to participate in a CSRT, and not one had com-
pleted successfully the appeals process Congress provided for in
the DTA."
In the aftermath of the Supreme Court's decision in Boume-
diene, Congress and the new administration must re-evaluate our
detainee processes and move U.S. detainee policy back under the
purview of the political branches. Ironically, and despite its hold-
ing, the Court stated that
[iun considering both the procedural and substantive standards used
to impose detention to prevent acts of terrorism, proper deference
must be accorded to the political branches. Unlike the President and
some designated Members of Congress, neither the Members of this
Court nor most federal judges begin the day with briefings that may
describe new and serious threats to our Nation and its people.
12
As the Court recognized, the political branches are better
suited to understand issues of national security. For example, the
members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence are well
aware of the national security threats that face our nation and
have been entrusted by their colleagues to consider fully those
threats as new policies in the GWOT are debated.
Over the past few years, Congress has responded quickly to
address those court rulings that apply to detainees. With the de-
alternative remedies. See id. at 2274 (requiring "exhaustion of alternative remedies before
a prisoner can seek federal habeas relieff); Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 758
(1975); Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 253 (1886).
11. As of November 24, 2008, 193 petitions had been filed with the D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals under the appeals provision of the DTA, though several had already been dis-
missed by that time. Letter from Joseph A. Benkert, Assistant Sec'y of Def., Dep't of Def.,
to author (Nov. 24, 2008) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Benkert Letter]. The Bou-
mediene ruling left the future of DTA cases uncertain because of potential jurisdictional
issues in the Court of Appeals. Id. On January 9, 2009, the D.C. Circuit ruled that the
provision in the DTA granting that court subject matter jurisdiction over CSRT appeals
could not be severed from the provision of the MCA that Boumediene declared unconstitu-
tional. See Bismullah v. Gates, No. 06-1197, slip op. at 2-3 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 9, 2009). There-
fore, the D.C. Circuit no longer had jurisdiction to hear appeals from CSRT determina-
tions. Id.
12. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2276-77 (internal citation omitted).
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cision in Boumediene, Congress will have to do so again. There
are many policy and national security considerations with regard
to the legal rights the United States should afford to detainees in
the GWOT that must be examined and addressed swiftly before
courts are allowed to develop further U.S. policy to our nation's
detriment. This commentary will lay out a brief history of con-
gressional action on detainee policy, as well as discuss potential
action for the political branches to consider in the near future.
II. CONGRESSIONAL HISTORY ON THE DETENTION OF TERRORISTS
A. Authorization for the Global War on Terrorism
The attacks of September 11, 2001 undoubtedly required a
massive and novel response from the United States. Faced with a
transnational enemy who successfully attacked the United States
or its interests on more than one occasion, and who threatened to
do so again, the response was meant to incapacitate A1-Qaeda.
When Congress passed the AUMF, it condemned the terrorist
attacks as treacherous violence and cited the necessity for the
United States to exercise its right to self-defense.1" The AUMF
granted the President authority
to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, or-
ganizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, commit-
ted, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11,
2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent
any future acts of international terrorism against the United States
by such nations, organizations or persons.
14
In passing the AUMF, Congress created specific statutory author-
ity to combat the perpetrators of the September 11th attacks, Al-
Qaeda, and those who support them. This authority, as well as
authority provided under the laws of war, gave the United States
the right to detain enemy combatants. 15
13. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006)).
14. Id.
15. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4(A),
opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
[Vol. 43:821
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B. Combatant Status Review Tribunals
In 2004, the Supreme Court decided Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, hold-
ing, in a plurality opinion, that the President was authorized to
detain enemy combatants for the duration of hostilities "based on
longstanding law-of-war principles." 6 In Hamdi, the Court recog-
nized that the President's right to detain those enemies who
fought against the United States in Afghanistan was "so funda-
mental and accepted an incident to war as to be an exercise of the
'necessary and appropriate force' Congress . . .authorized the
President to use." 7 The Court also held that Congress authorized
the President to detain persons designated as enemy combatants,
including U.S. citizens such as Hamdi, without a criminal trial. 8
Although the Court rejected the detainee's petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, it determined that detention was permitted so
long as an enemy combatant had a process to challenge that de-
signation. 9
Largely as a result of the Court's due process requirements
from Hamdi, the Department of Defense ("DOD") created the
CSRT process to determine a detainee's status as an enemy com-
batant and to provide a mechanism for a detainee to challenge an
enemy combatant designation.2 ° The CSRTs are administrative
rather than adversarial, but each detainee has the opportunity to
present "reasonably available" evidence and witnesses to a panel
of three commissioned officers who will determine whether the
detainee meets the criteria for designation as an enemy comba-
tant.2" The DOD defines "enemy combatant" as "an individual
who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or asso-
ciated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United
States or its coalition partners[,] ... includ[ing] any person who
has committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostili-
ties in aid of enemy armed forces."22 Each detainee is provided a
military officer who serves as a personal representative, but not
16. 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
17. Id. at 518.
18. See id. at 519.
19. See id. at 533.
20. See Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec'y of Def., to the Sec'y of the
Navy, Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal (July 7, 2004), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d2004O7O7review.pdf.
21. See id. at (c), (e), (g)(8)-(12).
22. Id. at (a).
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as an advocate.23 The personal representative may, however, view
classified evidence, summarize it to the detainee, and comment
on it to the tribunal to aid in its determination.24 Each detainee
may elect to participate in the hearing or remain silent.25
Because of the hostile environments in which detainees have
been captured, the CSRTs are not bound by criminal rules of evi-
dence.26 Rather, the government's evidence is presumed to be ge-
nuine and accurate.2 ' For example, evidentiary limits on admit-
ting hearsay are tempered by practical considerations. 28 The
CSRT process recognizes that it makes no sense in the middle of a
war to compel soldiers fighting in Afghanistan or Iraq to leave the
frontlines just to testify about statements or evidence collection.
Although the standard used to determine a detainee's status as
an enemy combatant is a "preponderance of the evidence" stan-
dard, the process as a whole provides reasonable procedural safe-
guards to ensure a fair proceeding.29 For example, the govern-
ment is still required to present mitigating evidence and each
detainee may receive unclassified summaries of the relevant evi-
dence against him.3 °
C. The Detainee Treatment Act
Congress also took note of the Court's decision in Hamdi and
began crafting legislation to address the Supreme Court's con-
cerns. Before any legislation passed, however, the Supreme Court
held that the federal statutory habeas corpus provision extended
statutory habeas jurisdiction to GTMO because GTMO was not
outside the sovereignty of the United States.3 ' As a result of this
second Supreme Court decision, Congress passed and the Presi-
dent signed the DTA on December 30, 2005.32 The DTA included
23. See id. at (6).
24. Id.
25. Id. at (g)(10)-(11).
26. See id. at (g)(9).
27. Id. at (g)(9) and (g)(12).
28. Id. at (g)(9).
29. See id. at (g)(12).
30. See id. at (c).
31. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473 (2004).
32. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, 119 Stat. 2739
(codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 801, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd and
note (2006)).
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the Graham-Levin Amendment which eliminated the federal
courts' statutory jurisdiction over habeas corpus claims by aliens
detained at GTMO, but provided for an appeal of a status deter-
mination made by the CSRTs" Specifically, the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals ("D.C. Circuit") was given exclusive jurisdiction
to hear appeals of any status determination to ensure that such
determination was consistent with applicable DOD procedures
and evidentiary standards.34
The DTA also required DOD to conduct a yearly review of the
status of each prisoner.3 ' Additionally, the DTA required that the
CSRTs "shall provide for periodic review of any new evidence that
may become available relating to the enemy combatant status of
a detainee."36 In accordance with the DTA, DOD issued guidance
that if new evidence arose after a CSRT determination, the Depu-
ty Secretary of Defense would "direct that a CSRT convene to re-
consider the basis of the detainee's E[nemy] C[ombatant] status
in light of the new information."37
D. The Military Commissions Act
Following the enactment of the DTA, the Supreme Court again
waded into the military detention process. In Hamdan v. Rums-
feld, the Court held that the DTA did not apply to habeas peti-
tions filed prior to the DTA's enactment and that there were
flaws in the authority of the military commissions. 38 As a result,
Congress passed the MCA, which amended the DTA's provisions
regarding appellate review and habeas corpus jurisdiction. 39 Con-
gress expanded the DTA to make its review provisions the exclu-
sive remedy for all aliens detained as enemy combatants. ° Sec-
33. 151 CONG. REC. S12667 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 2005) (introduced by Sen. Graham,
passed by roll call vote, 49-42) (amended by SA2524, 151 CONG. REC. S12771 (daily ed.
Nov. 14, 2005)).
34. See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 § 1005(e)(2), 119 Stat. at 2742.
35. Id. at § 1005(d).
36. Id. at § 1005(a)(3).
37. Memorandum of Frank Sweigart, Dir. of the Office for the Admin. Review of the
Det. of Enemy Combatants, Dep't of Def., Procedure for Review of "New Evidence" Relat-
ing to Enemy Combatant (EC) Status, Instruction 5421.1 (May 7, 2007), available at
www.defenselink.mil/newsfMay2007/New%2OEvidence%20Instruction.pdf.
38. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 574-77 (2006).
39. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366 § 3(a), 7, 120 Stat. 2600,
2622, 2635-36 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 950g, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006)).
40. Id. § 7, 120 Stat. at 2635-36 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006)).
20091
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
tion 7 of the MCA explicitly revoked the jurisdiction of U.S. courts
to hear habeas corpus petitions by all aliens in U.S. custody held
as enemy combatants, including those pending at the time of
enactment.4' The statutory habeas provision, previously amended
by the DTA, was replaced by the MCA's decree that:
(1) No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or con-
sider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf
of an alien detained by the United States who has been determined
by the United States to have been properly detained as an enemy
combatant or is awaiting such determination.
(2) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) [review of CSRT determina-
tions] and (3) [review of final decisions of military commissions] of
section 1005(e) of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (10 U.S.C. 801
note), no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or
consider any other action against the United States or its agents re-
lating to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or
conditions of confinement of an alien who is or was detained by the
United States and has been determined by the United States to have
been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such
determination.
42
Under the MCA, therefore, appeals from a final decision by a
military commission would continue to go to the D.C. Circuit but
would be routed through a new appellate body, the Court of Mili-
tary Commission Review ("CMCR").43 Review of a decision by a
military commission could only concern matters of law, not fact."
Appeals could be based on inconsistencies with the procedures set
forth in the MCA, or, "to the extent applicable, the Constitution
or laws of the United States."45 CSRT determinations would con-
tinue to be appealable directly to the D.C. Circuit.46
The sequence of events described above shows plainly that
Congress intentionally and unequivocally stripped jurisdiction to
hear habeas petitions by detainees at GTMO from the courts.
There is no ambiguity in the language of the DTA and MCA-it
was the desire and intent of the political branches to keep the
terrorists held at GTMO out of the U.S. court system, except
41. Id. The Court ruled section 7 unconstitutional in Boumediene. Boumediene v.
Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2274 (2008).
42. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006).
43. 10 U.S.C. § 950f(2006).
44. Id. § 950g(b).
45. Id. § 950g(c).
46. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, § 1005(e)(2),
119 Stat. 2739, 2742 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 801 note (2006)).
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FUTURE OF DETAINEES
through the appellate processes that the two Acts lay out, and to
deny them the constitutional rights that our own citizens enjoy.
III. BOUMEDIENE AND ITS IMPACT ON CURRENT POLICY
A. Boumediene History
On February 20, 2007, the D.C. Circuit in Boumediene v. Bush,
upheld the MCA's habeas-stripping provision. The court's deci-
sion applied to a number of pending habeas cases, all of which in-
volved non-U.S. nationals detained at GTMO.48 There were two
main questions on appeal. First, the court considered whether
Congress intended the MCA to eliminate habeas review for all
alien enemy combatants-including those who had filed habeas
petitions before the MCA was enacted." Both the majority and
the dissent agreed that the plain language of the MCA prevented
courts from hearing any habeas petition filed by an alien detained
at GTMO, regardless of when the habeas petition was filed.5°
The second, and primary question, was whether the MCA's
elimination of habeas review for detainees was consistent with
the Suspension Clause of the U.S. Constitution.51 The D.C. Cir-
cuit looked at the historical scope of habeas and concluded that
non-U.S. citizens held outside the United States historically did
not have a right to habeas review.52 The court then found that,
because Congress and the executive branch had determined ex-
plicitly that GTMO was not within the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States, the detainees held at GTMO were not detained
within the territorial United States.53 Thus, the MCA did not
suspend habeas because there was nothing to suspend--"the
Constitution does not confer rights on aliens without property or
presence within the United States."54
47. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 988-92 (D.C. Cir. 2007), rev'd, 128 S. Ct. 2229
(2008).
48. See id. at 904.
49. Id. at 986.
50. Id. at 986-88; id. at 994 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 988.
52. Id. at 988-92.
53. Id. at 992.
54. Id. at 991.
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B. Supreme Court Decision in Boumediene
On June 12, 2008, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in
Boumediene v. Bush, holding that detainees held at GTMO have
the constitutional privilege of habeas corpus and that section 7 of
the MCA-which stripped the courts' jurisdiction to hear habeas
claims from detainees-was unconstitutional because the proce-
dural mechanisms in the DTA were not an adequate substitute
for the writ of habeas corpus.55 The Court asserted that if Con-
gress's intent was to deny habeas privileges to these detainees, it
must formally suspend the writ as mandated by the Suspension
Clause of the Constitution. 6
The Suspension Clause states that "The Privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."57 Al-
though the Court held that the clear language of section 7 of the
MCA strips jurisdiction from the courts and that, if the statute is
valid under the Constitution, the cases must be dismissed,58 the
Court found the "MCA does not purport to be a formal suspension
of the writ."59 In rejecting the idea that the CSRT process was an
adequate substitute for habeas corpus relief, the Court noted that
it did not allow the detainees to "challenge the President's legal
authority to detain them, contest the CSRT's findings of fact,
supplement the record on review with exculpatory evidence, and
request an order of release."6 °
In determining whether the Suspension Clause applied to the
detainees at GTMO, the Court considered three factors:
(1) the citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the
process through which that status determination was made; (2) the
nature of the sites where apprehension and then detention took
place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the pris-
oner's entitlement to the writ.
61
55. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2240 (2008).
56. See id. at 2262 ("If the privilege of habeas corpus is to be denied to the detainees
now before us, Congress must act in accordance with the requirements of the Suspension
Clause.").
57. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
58. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2242.
59. Id. at 2262.
60. See id. at 2274.
61. Id. at 2259.
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First, the Court found that the status of the detainees was in
question because the detainees denied they were enemy comba-
tants and because the CSRTs were inadequate, due to both the
lack of counsel afforded to the detainees and the presumption of
validity accorded to the government's evidence.62 Second, the
Court found that the detainees' location at GTMO, where they
were under U.S. control, should be given weight." Finally, the
Court found few, if any, practical barriers to extending habeas to
those at GTMO. 4 The Court noted that to the extent practical
barriers did arise, habeas "procedures likely [could] be modified
to address them."6"
The Supreme Court's decision in Boumediene was a marked
departure from previous jurisprudence. In the leading case on
point, Johnson v. Eisentrager, the Court refused to grant habeas
rights to enemy combatants detained during World War II and
later held in a prison in Allied-occupied Germany.6 The Eisen-
trager Court considered
(a) [that each petitioner was] an enemy alien; (b) ha[d] never been or
resided in the United States, (c) was captured outside of our territory
and there held in military custody as a prisoner of war; (d) was tried
and convicted by a Military Commission sitting outside the United
States; (e) for offenses against laws of war committed outside the
United States; (f) and is at all times imprisoned outside the United
States.
67
None of these factors relied on the procedural protections afforded
to the petitioners. Instead, the Court in Eisentrager examined the
status and nature of the detainees and their detention.
Boumediene attempted to distinguish Eisentrager because the
Eisentrager detainees had been tried and convicted already.6"
Conveniently, the Court failed to recognize a key distinction be-
tween the Boumediene detainees and those in Eisentrager. Unlike
in Eisentrager, where the war had ended, the United States still
is engaged in military action against the very enemies associated
with the GTMO detainees. If the Court had considered this dis-
62. Id. at 2259-60.
63. Id. at 2260-61.
64. Id. at 2261-62.
65. Id. at 2262.
66. 339 U.S. 763, 766, 781 (1950).
67. Id. at 777.
68. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2259-60.
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tinction, along with the other factors in Eisentrager, it might have
concluded that the detainees at GTMO more closely resemble
prisoners of an ongoing war whose detention would be undeniably
justified.69 It is ironic that the Court found GTMO to be within
the de facto control of the United States," yet complained that
the Court of Appeals could not instruct the release of a detainee
upon finding unlawful detention.71 If GTMO is under the jurisdic-
tion of the courts, then surely a court could make and enforce
such an order, if only in a legal sense.
In his dissent in Boumediene, Chief Justice Roberts pointed out
that the Court in Hamdi "explained that the Constitution guar-
anteed an American citizen challenging his detention as an ene-
my combatant the right to 'notice of the factual basis for his clas-
sification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's
factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker."'72 Further,
Roberts argued the Court in Hamdi thought this could be accom-
plished "by an appropriately authorized and properly constituted
military tribunal."73 As Chief Justice Roberts noted, "surely the
Due Process Clause does not afford non-citizens in such circums-
tances greater protection than citizens are due."74
Despite the fact that the D.C. Circuit found it unnecessary to
address whether the DTA provided adequate substitute proce-
dures for habeas, the Supreme Court decided to rule on this issue
on first impression. The Court justified this departure by conclud-
ing that habeas "entitle[d] the prisoner to a meaningful opportu-
nity to demonstrate that he [was] being held pursuant to 'the er-
roneous application or interpretation' of relevant law"75 and that
a "court must have the power to order the conditional release of
69. The Court in Boumediene discussed the threat faced in post-World War II Germa-
ny and recognized that American forces "faced potential security threats from a defeated
enemy.... [and] the Court was right to be concerned about judicial interference with the
military's efforts to contain 'enemy elements, guerilla fighters, and were-wolves.'" Id. at
2261 (quoting Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 784). This discussion ignores the reality of the
threat the U.S., and in particular U.S. armed forces, face around the world from Al-Qaeda,
and instead focuses solely on the general security of the U.S. military base GTMO.
70. Id. at 2253.
71. Id. at 2271.
72. Id. at 2281 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507,
533 (2004)).
73. Id. (quoting Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 538).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 2266 (majority opinion) (quoting Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v.
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 302 (2001)).
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an individual unlawfully detained."76 According to the opinion,
these were not the only requirements of the privilege of habeas
and more might be required depending on the circumstances.77
However, as Chief Justice Roberts pointed out in his dissent, the
majority failed to define what due process rights the detainees
did possess and whether the DTA satisfied them because the
Court did not allow the D.C. Circuit an opportunity to rule on
them.78
The DTA allows the D.C. Circuit to review whether the stan-
dards and procedures used by the DOD to determine a detainee's
enemy combatant status are lawful under a preponderance of the
evidence, with a rebuttable presumption in favor of the govern-
ment.79 Yet, the Boumediene Court held this process deficient be-
cause a detainee is not able to challenge findings of fact or sup-
plement the record." If the CSRT's determinations were final
judgments, statute and judicial precedents suggests the review
should be limited to the record, with judicial discretion to hold
additional evidentiary hearings.8" Additionally, even in pre-trial
detention hearings for individuals charged with the most serious
criminal offenses, "[t]he rules concerning admissibility of evi-
dence... do not apply to the presentation and consideration of in-
formation at the hearing."82
IV. POTENTIAL CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
A. The Aftermath of Boumediene
Immediately following the Court's decision in Boumediene, ad-
ditional detainees filed habeas petitions in the district courts.8 3
Courts have moved quickly to schedule hearings for them, as in-
structed by the Boumediene decision.84 The decision in Boume-
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See id. at 2279-80 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 2272 (majority opinion).
80. See id. at 2270.
81. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(e)-(f), 2255 (2006).
82. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (2006).
83. See Michael John Garcia, Congressional Research Service, BOUMEDIENE V. BUSH:
GUANTANAMO DETAINEES' RIGHT TO HABEAS CORPUS 9 (2008), available at http://fpc.state.
gov/documents/organization/110754.pdf.
84. There are 220 habeas petitions pending before the D.C. District Circuit Courts.
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diene left open the possibility that the government would be re-
quired to defend challenges on two fronts: (1) in habeas proceed-
ings in the district courts and (2) against those detainees who fol-
low the D.C. Circuit appeals process provided in the DTA for any
CSRT status determination." Recognizing this burden, the Gov-
ernment argued to the D.C. Circuit that the DTA provision grant-
ing the D.C. Circuit jurisdiction over CSRT determinations could
not be severed from the now-unconstitutional provision eliminat-
ing habeas corpus. 6 Still, the Justice Department may not have
the resources to defend against the habeas challenges alone.
Congress should address the many questions left unresolved by
the Court, as well as provide a narrower legal framework for
courts to proceed in current litigation. As Chief Justice Roberts
astutely observed, "[T]he political branches crafted CSRT and
D.C. Circuit review to operate together, with the goal of providing
noncitizen detainees the level of collateral process Hamdi said
would satisfy the due process rights of American citizens."" In-
deed, "Congress followed the Court's lead, only to find itself the
victim of a constitutional bait and switch." 8 Given the Court's in-
terference in a string of detainee cases, it is not clear that any ac-
tion by the political branches will be followed.
B. A Possible Solution
Remedial action by Congress does not guarantee a solution, but
there are four main legislative fixes which could alleviate the
burdens resulting from the Court's opinion. First, Congress must
clarify and reaffirm the President's authority to detain individu-
als in the GWOT. Second, Congress must provide a stay for any
habeas petition filed by those detainees who have been charged
already by military commission. Third, Congress must revise the
CSRT process to make it an adequate substitute for habeas. Fi-
nally, Congress must prohibit the entry or release of any detainee
into the United States.
Benkert Letter, supra note 11.
85. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2275 (2008) ("[Tlhe petitioners in these
cases need not exhaust the review procedures in the Court of Appeals before proceeding
with their habeas actions in the District Court.").
86. See Bismullah v. Gates, No. 06-1197, slip op. at 2-3 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 9, 2009).
87. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2286 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 2285.
[Vol. 43:821
FUTURE OF DETAINEES
On the first point, Congress must reaffirm the President's au-
thority to detain enemy combatants that the courts may other-
wise weaken due to the length of time which has passed since the
AUMF was enacted. The President has implied authority from
the AUMF to detain individuals in the GWOT, as well as inhe-
rent constitutional authority as Commander in Chief. 9 In its
analysis of whether or not the DTA was an adequate substitute,
the Court specifically cited as inadequate the fact that it did not
allow AUMF challenges to the President's authority to detain in-
dividuals.9" The Court's analysis raises the possibility that indi-
viduals who may have been captured in places around the world
other than on the battlefield in Afghanistan could challenge the
President's authority to detain them based on the AUMF. The
Court's insistence on a detainee's ability to challenge this author-
ity is another example of judicial interference with the will and
constitutional duty of the political branches to engage in foreign
affairs and protect national security. Congress must act to clarify
the political will as well as the nature of the current hostilities in
which the United States is engaged.
Apparently, congressional action is needed to remind the Court
of its own precedents and to make certain that the President's
constitutional power is preserved. 91 Congress needs to remind the
Court that its role is not to "vindicate" the President's power; ra-
ther, it is to interpret statutes that Congress has passed.92 The
Court in Boumediene reaffirmed its plurality conclusion in Hamdi
that the detention of individuals captured in the GWOT "'for the
duration of the particular conflict in which they were captured, is
so fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to be an exer-
cise of the 'necessary and appropriate force' Congress has autho-
89. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
90. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2271-72 ("Whether the President has such authority
turns on whether the AUMF authorizes-and the Constitution permits-the indefinite
detention of 'enemy combatants' as the Department of Defense defines that term.").
91. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 635
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (the power of the president, with congressional acquies-
cence, is at its "maximum" because "it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus
all that Congress can delegate"); id. at 637 (an act "executed by the President pursuant to
an Act of Congress would be supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest
latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon
any who might attack it.").
92. See Boumediene, 126 S. Ct. at 2277 ("On the contrary, the exercise of [the] powers
[of the Commander in Chiefl is vindicated, not eroded, when confirmed by the Judicial
Branch.").
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rized the President to use."'93 In a strange twist of logic, the Court
then tossed out Hamdi and years of other precedents by suggest-
ing due process requires the ability to challenge the president's
authority. In the past, the Court has given great deference to the
President's authority under the Constitution to detain individuals
during conflict.94 Congress needs to reaffirm that the United
States is in armed conflict with Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and all
those who support them,95 because they no doubt continue to pose
a threat to the United States.
Second, Congress should provide a stay for habeas petitions
filed by those detainees who have been charged already by mili-
tary commissions. To date, over 550 detainees have gone through
the CSRTs,96 and twenty-three detainees have been charged with
crimes by a military commission.97 Two of those charged have
been convicted already.9" There are also about 250 additional de-
tainees who have gone through the CSRT process and remain at
93. Id. at 2240-41 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004)); see also id.
at 2277 ("The law must accord the Executive substantial authority to apprehend and de-
tain those who pose a real danger to our security.").
94. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518 ("The capture and detention of lawful combatants and
the capture, detention, and trial of unlawful combatants, by 'universal agreement and
practice,' are 'important incident[s] of war.'") (citing Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28, 30
(1942)).
95. The term "support" is used as commonly known: "to provide for ... tolerate ...
[give] assistance." RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1295 (2d ed. 1997).
Today, A1-Qaeda has support from a number of associated terrorist organizations globally,
making it difficult to prove clear and convincing connections to the core of Al-Qaeda. See
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, THE TERRORIST THREAT TO THE U.S. HOMELAND, July
2007, available at http://www.dni.gov/press releases/20070717_release.pdf [hereinafter
NIC, TERRORIST THREAT] ("We assess that al-Qa'ida will continue to enhance its capabili-
ties to attack the Homeland through greater cooperation with regional terrorist groups.").
96. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, LIST OF DETAINEES WHO WENT THROUGH COMPLETE
CSRT PROCESS, http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/detainee-list.pdf
97. E-mail from Anonymous Department of Defense Official to Jennifer Wagner, Pro-
fessional Staff Member for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (Oct. 20, 2008,
16:52 EST) (on file with author).
98. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Def., Detainee Convicted of Terrorism Charge at Mili-
tary Commission Trial (Nov. 3, 2008), available at httpJ/www.defenselink.mil/releases/re
lease.aspx?releaseid=12329; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Def., Detainee Convicted of Ter-
rorism Charge at Military Commission Trial (Aug. 6, 2008), available at http://www.def
enselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=12118.
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GTMO.99 In contrast, 220 have filed for a writ of habeas corpus in
federal court.' 0
The Court in Boumediene recognized that it traditionally "re-
quire[s] exhaustion of alternative remedies before a prisoner can
seek federal habeas relief."' Yet, the Court inexplicably found
that the detainees were "entitled to a prompt habeas corpus hear-
ing" because there was "no showing that the Executive faces such
onerous burdens that it cannot respond to habeas corpus ac-
tions."0 2 Aside from turning years of precedent on its head, the
Court's decision placed the executive branch in the untenable po-
sition of expending precious resources to defend duplicative and
simultaneous litigation from these detainees.
Although the Court held the CSRT process inadequate as a
substitute for habeas, it did not find the process unconstitution-
al. 0 3 Thus, according to the Court, nothing barred a detainee
from requiring the executive branch to defend against habeas pe-
titions, CSRT appeals, and military commission appeals concur-
rently.' 4 Despite this quagmire, the Court recognized-but de-
cided to ignore-these deficiencies in the judicial system. "[Wiere
it probable that the Court of Appeals could complete a prompt re-
view of their applications [for CSRT determinations under the
DTA]," the Court would be more inclined to require the exhaus-
tion of alternative remedies.0 5 But to do so "would be to require
additional months, if not years, of delay."0 6 The Court stated this
despite the fact that the detainees had "steadfastly refused to
avail themselves of the [DTA's] review mechanisms."0 7 At a min-
99. See Gerry J. Gilmore, Gates Cites Positive Response to Pending Guantanamo Clo-
sure, AM. FORCES PRESS SERVICE, Jan. 22, 2009, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsar
ticle.aspx?id=52774.
100. Benkert Letter, supra note 11.
101. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2274 (2008); see, e.g., Schlesinger v. Coun-
cilman, 420 U.S. 738, 758 (1975); Exparte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 253 (1886).
102. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2275.
103. Id. ("The only law we identify as unconstitutional is MCA § 7 .... [B]oth the DTA
and the CSRT process remain intact.").
104. The D.C. Circuit disagreed with the Court and held that by invalidating section 7
of the MCA, the provisions of the DTA that granted CSRT appeals jurisdiction to the D.C.
Circuit also became invalid because the provisions are inseverable. See Bismullah v.
Gates, No. 06-1197, slip op. at 2-3 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 9, 2009). Thus, the ruling in Boumediene
effectively granted what Congress had expressly eliminated and eliminated what Congress
had explicitly granted. There has not been a challenge to a military commission ruling.
105. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2275.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 2282 n.1 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
2009]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
imum, therefore, it makes sense that any habeas proceedings for
detainees charged by military commission be stayed, pending the
outcome of their CSRT appeal or a military commission appeal.
This assumes, of course, that the Court will not overlook congres-
sional intent in the future and hold any portion of the military
commissions or appeals process deficient as devoid of due process
rights."1
Third, Congress needs to re-examine thoroughly the CSRT
process and attempt to follow the Court's vague instructions as to
what would make that process an adequate substitute for a writ
of habeas corpus petition. For those detainees who have not yet
been, or may never be, charged by military commission, Congress
should pass legislation to increase protections for the detainees in
the CSRT process, thus meeting the Court's standard for an ade-
quate substitute for habeas. To do this without damaging our na-
tional security, however, Congress must limit the disclosure of
classified information in any court proceeding.
Unfortunately, the Court was silent on exactly what rights or
processes would be adequate. The Court, however, did imply that
the outcome of future cases may be different for detainees going
through a different CSRT process and suggested some procedural
protections which would strengthen the process. °9 According to
the Court, a detainee's ability to "contest the CSRT's findings of
fact, supplement the record on review with exculpatory evidence,
and request an order of release would come close" to satisfying
statutory habeas corpus requirements.' 10 Any legislation should
108. This also assumes that President Obama will not ignore past congressional action.
On January 22, 2009, President Obama issued an executive order requiring that all mili-
tary commissions be halted. Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009). On
January 29, 2009, a military judge denied a government motion requesting a continuance
in a military commission proceeding, stating that "Congress passes the Military Commis-
sion Act which remains in effect. The Commission is bound by the law as it currently ex-
ists not as it may change in the future." U.S. v. Al-Nashiri, Case No. P-002, slip op. at pa-
ra. 4(e) (Jan. 29, 2009), http://www.defenselink.milnews/Jan2009/DelayArraignment-
MJ.pdf. On February 5, 2009, the convening authority for military commissions dropped
the charges against al-Nashiri in order to comply with President Obama's Executive Or-
der. Gerry J. Gilmore, Judge Dismisses Charges Against USS Cole Suspect at Guantana-
mo, Am. FORCES PRESS SERVICE, Feb. 6, 2009, www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.as
px?id=52990.
109. See id. at 2275 (majority opinion) ("If and when habeas corpus jurisdiction applies,
as it does in these cases, then proper deference can be accorded to reasonable procedures
for screening and initial detention under lawful and proper conditions of confinement and
treatment for a reasonable period of time.").
110. Id. at 2274.
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begin by addressing these issues, even though the Court ignored
the DTA's express allowance for "the D.C. Circuit to remand a de-
tainee's case for a new CSRT determination" if new evidence
arose.
111
The elements identified in Boumediene could be satisfied by in-
corporating elements from U.S. criminal law into the process, an
unprecedented benefit for foreign nationals located outside the
United States during a time of war. For example, the Bail Reform
Act of 1966 affords the government a "rebuttable presumption"
with respect to their efforts to detain a defendant prior to a tri-
al." 2 In practice, this presumption saves the government from
having to prove the competency, authenticity, and weight of the
evidence supporting pre-trial detention for individuals charged
with some of the most serious criminal offenses.113 Similarly, an
express rebuttable presumption could be provided for the gov-
ernment in pursuing the continued detention of detainees at
GTMO. This would usually offer a detainee some opportunity to
challenge the government's evidence before a trier of fact deter-
mines the outcome. Also, the statutory habeas provisions applica-
ble to state and federal custody, although restricted to post-
judgment hearings, presume the factual record to be correct and
limit new evidence, including exculpatory, to claims that rely on
a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered
through the exercise of due diligence; and ... the facts underlying
the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder
would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense. 1
14
Applying these processes to the CSRT context would allow the
detainee to introduce exculpatory evidence during the review
process while giving substantial judicial deference to the due dili-
gence of the government. Such deference would necessarily in-
clude an acceptance of the difficult "trial" environment that a
CSRT faces. As former Attorney General Michael Mukasey so
aptly observed, "this is not CSI Kandahar."" 5
111. Id. at 2289 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
112. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (2006).
113. See id. §§ 3142(e), 3142(f)(1).
114. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (2006).
115. Michael Mukasey, U.S. Attorney Gen., Address at the American Enterprise Insti-
tute for Public Policy Research (July 21, 2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/
2008/July/08-opa-633.html.
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Finally, and of most importance, Congress needs to ensure that
none of the detainees at GTMO have physical access to the Unit-
ed States or may be released into the United States. Although the
Court in Boumediene held that one way in which the DTA was an
inadequate substitute for habeas was the inability to order the re-
lease of the detainee,116 the Court disregarded the fact that hun-
dreds of detainees have been transferred or released to date, and
dozens released specifically upon a determination by the CSRT
that each detainee was not an enemy combatant.'17 Not one of
these detainees, however, has been released into the United
States. If district courts are now able to hear habeas petitions and
order the release of detainees,"' any legislation Congress consid-
ers must make it clear that detainees held at GTMO will not be
transferred to the United States, released into the United States,
or provided with any rights that accompany being located in the
United States. A1-Qaeda searches everyday for operatives who
can evade our enhanced security mechanisms in its quest to
commit another attack against our homeland.'19 It is important to
remember that most detainees held at GTMO were captured on
the battlefields in Afghanistan or Iraq and were determined to be
a threat to our efforts to combat terrorism; others were appre-
hended in other parts of the world based on the reasonable suspi-
cion that they were connected to Al-Qaeda. Whatever their ties to
terrorists groups or activities, these individuals should never be
given the privilege of crossing our borders. To do so would be
116. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
117. Over 500 detainees have been transferred or released from GTMO since 2002. See
Press Release, Dep't of Def., Detainee Transfer Announced (Dec. 16, 2008), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaselD=12394. Of those, forty-two
have been released as a result of being designated no longer enemy combatants. See Ben-
kert Letter, supra note 11; E-mail from Anonymous Department of Defense Official to
Jennifer Wagner, Professional Staff Member for the Senate Select Committee on Intelli-
gence (Feb 3., 2009, 18:02 EST) (on file with author).
118. On February 18, 2009, the D.C. Circuit reversed a district court ruling ordering
the government to bring seventeen GTMO detainees, who had filed habeas petitions, to
the United States and release them. Kiyemba v. Obama, 08-5424, slip op. at 3-4, 18 (D.C.
Cir. Feb. 18, 2009). The court aptly points out that the right to admit an alien into the
United States rests solely with the political branches. Id. at 7 ("With respect to the exclu-
sive power of the political branches in this area, there is, as the Supreme Court stated in
Galvan, 'not merely a page of history... but a whole volume.'") (citing Galvan v. Press,
347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954)). However, the case does not address the ability of the courts to
order the release of these detainees into the physical United States if President Obama
transfers them to U.S. territory, even under limited or no immigration status.
119. See NIC, TERRORIST THREAT, supra note 95 ("Although we have discovered only a
handful of individuals in the United States with ties to al-Qa'ida senior leadership since
9/11, we judge that al-Qa'ida will intensify its efforts to put operatives here.").
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nothing short of an invitation for A1-Qaeda to operate inside our
homeland.
C. Classified Information
Any habeas challenge will certainly require an examination of
the classified intelligence and other information supporting the
detainee's connection to a terrorist organization. Congressional
action clarifying the President's authority to detain individuals,
regardless of where they were captured, may assist the courts in
finding that a detainee's connections to Al-Qaeda are sufficient
for his detention and may lessen the need to expose classified in-
formation in the process. 2 ° As it stands today, however, any ex-
amination of the records used in the CSRT process may expose
sensitive intelligence, particularly intelligence the United States
has received from interrogations. In order to avoid the disclosure
of sensitive sources and methods, courts must respect the gov-
ernment's assertions and examine them, at a minimum, under a
rebuttable presumption standard similar to that used in criminal
bail hearings.'21
How should this be accomplished? One possible legislative so-
lution is to create a tiered process for sharing information with
the detainee, such as releasing any unclassified information to
the detainee and only releasing SECRET information to a cleared
counsel for the detainee. If a judge requires additional informa-
tion, then the government should release TOP SECRET informa-
tion, and anything above that, only to the judge in camera and ex
parte.
Some have complained about any effort to restrict information
a detainee may see during the course of a CSRT. For years, our
criminal justice system has used the Classified Information Pro-
cedures Act to protect classified information from unwarranted
disclosure while ensuring that the criminal process is fair.'22 No
120. See Boumediene v. Bush, 126 S. Ct. 2229, 2276 (2008) ("Another of Congress' rea-
sons for vesting exclusive jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals, perhaps, was to avoid the
widespread dissemination of classified information .... We make no attempt to anticipate
all of the evidentiary and access-to-counsel issues that will arise during the course of the
detainees' habeas corpus proceedings. We recognize, however, that the Government has a
legitimate interest in protecting sources and methods of intelligence gathering...
121. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
122. See Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. 3 (2006).
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less deference to the protection of classified information should be
afforded the CSRT process. These detainees are not ordinary
criminals. They are terrorists-terrorists who in many cases have
taken an oath to kill our citizens and destroy our country. There
is no reason to ever give them access to classified information.
D. Other Concerns
Since the Court in Boumediene opened the U.S. judicial system
to petitions filed by detainees, Congress should make sure that
enemy combatants are not afforded due process protections that
even U.S. citizens are denied. No one can reasonably argue that a
non-U.S. national captured on the battlefield in Afghanistan or
Iraq deserves all, or even substantial, due process protections
which a U.S. citizen facing criminal prosecution would not be
granted. As such, Congress should look to U.S. criminal law and
allow a court to deny a writ "on the merits, notwithstanding the
failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available" in oth-
er venues.123 Congress should also limit the number of habeas pe-
titions detainees are allowed to file by applying current federal
habeas law specifically to detainee habeas actions.124
V. CONCLUSION
It is crucial to our national security that the political branches
of the federal government act swiftly to answer the questions
Boumediene left open and define the legal boundaries for future
habeas petitions in U.S. courts.'25 In this ongoing GWOT, it is
clear that terrorists are not reasonable actors capable of negotiat-
ing cease-fires or willing to end their attacks against innocent
Americans. Osama bin Laden has made clear that Al-Qaeda be-
lieves it is the duty of all Muslims to wage jihad against the Unit-
ed States and its allies.126 This threat is compounded each time
123. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (2006).
124. See id. § 2244 (requiring dismissal of "second or successive" habeas petitions).
125. Legislation was introduced in the 110th Congress, but was not considered by the
Senate Judiciary Committee. See Enemy Combatant Detention Review Act of 2008, S.
3401, 110th Cong. (2008).
126. See Osama bin Laden, Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the
Land of the Two Holy Places, Aug. 1996, available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terror
ismlinternationallfatwa_1996.html (originally published in Al Quds Al Arabi (London));
see also James Risen & David Johnston, Two Years Later: Qaeda Leaders; Bin Laden is
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the United States releases a detainee from GTMO. As of the end
of December 2008, of the GTMO detainees transferred from U.S.
custody, there are "18 confirmed and 43 suspected of returning to
the fight. So 61 in all former Guantanamo detainees are con-
firmed or suspected of returning to the fight."127
Clearly cognizant of this global threat, Congress and the Presi-
dent over the past several years have enacted significant pieces of
legislation to address terrorism. Unfortunately, and in sharp con-
trast to the balance of power ordained by our founders, the inten-
tions of the political branches have been disregarded by the Judi-
ciary. No American who values his constitutional rights should
want terrorists who have been detained holding weapons, fight-
ing for Al-Qaeda's cause in war zones, and aiming to kill U.S. sol-
diers to receive the full benefit of the Constitution of the most
democratic and free society in the world.
For reasons that are beyond the comprehension of many, the
Supreme Court failed to recognize or appreciate the nature of the
enemy who confronts us today. In one breath, the Court in Bou-
mediene noted that "[slecurity depends upon a sophisticated intel-
ligence apparatus and the ability of our Armed Forces to act and
to interdict."12 One would imagine the Court meant the ability to
interdict any enemy who would do the United States harm. Yet,
the Court continued, "[slecurity subsists, too, in fidelity to free-
dom's first principles. Chief among these are freedom from arbi-
trary and unlawful restraint and the personal liberty that is se-
cured by adherence to the separation of powers."'29 For over 200
years, these principles have guided Americans in their daily con-
duct and in their respect for their homeland, their values, and
their government. A1-Qaeda is waging a violent war against these
very same principles-principles that the Court in Boumediene
took great pains to bestow upon them. With each court decision
since the 9/11 terrorist attacks on our homeland, A1-Qaeda must
gain more and more gratitude for our fidelity to freedom's first
principles. It is time for Congress to reclaim these first principles
for the American people, not for terrorists.
Seen with Aide on Tape, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2003, at Ai.
127. DoD News Briefing with Geoff Morrell from the Pentagon, Department of Defense
(Jan. 13, 2009), http'//www.defenselink.milltranscripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4340.
128. Boumediene v. Bush, 126 S. Ct. 2229, 2277 (2008).
129. Id.
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